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This paper ties together the macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence on the 
competitiveness of African manufacturing sectors.   The conceptual framework is 
based on the newer theories that see the evolution of comparative advantage as 
influenced by the business climate -- a key public good -- and by external economies 
between clusters of firms entering in related sectors.   Macroeconomic data from 
purchasing power parity (PPP), though imprecisely measured, estimates confirms 
that Africa is high-cost relative to its levels of income and productivity.   
 
This finding is compared with firm-level evidence from surveys undertaken for 
Investment Climate Assessments in 2000-2004.  These confirm a pattern of 
generally low productivity, and also suggest the importance of high indirect costs and 
business-environment-related losses in depressing the productivity of African firms 
relative to those in other countries.  There are differences between African countries, 
however, with some showing evidence of a stronger business community and better 
business climate.   
 
Finally, the paper adopts a political-economy perspective on the prospects for reform 
of Africa’s business climate, considering African attitudes to business and the 
fractured nature of African business sectors as between indigenous, minority and 
foreign investors.  The latter have far higher productivity and a greater propensity to 
export; however, Africa’s difficult business climate and the tendency to overcome 
this by working in ethnic networks slows new entry and may decrease the incentives 
of key parts of the business community form constituting an aggressive pressure 
group for reform.  Even though reforms are moving forward in several countries, this 
slows their impact and raises the possibility that countries settle into a low-
productivity equilibrium. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings for 
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This paper considers the impact of high indirect costs and losses in reducing the productivity and 
competitiveness of African manufacturing, and the complications posed for reforms by business 
sectors heavily segmented by size, productivity and ethnicity.  The conceptual framework is 
based on trade theories that see the evolution of comparative advantage as influenced by the 
business climate—a key public good—and by external economies between clusters of firms 
entering related sectors.  Macroeconomic data from purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates, 
though imprecisely measured, confirm that Africa is high-cost relative to its levels of income and 
productivity.   
 
Firm-level estimates using data from surveys undertaken for Investment Climate Assessments in 
2000-2004 indicate the importance of high indirect costs and business environment–related 
losses in further depressing the performance of African firms relative to those in other countries, 
when performance is expanded from a “factory-floor” concept towards a broader “net 
productivity” measure.  There are differences between African countries, however, with some 
showing evidence of a stronger business community and better business climate, and these show 
up in the results.   
 
African business sectors are sparse and fractured along ethnic dimensions (indigenous, minority, 
and foreign investors),  and with wide differences in the productivity of large and small firms.  
The paper adopts a political-economy perspective on the prospects for reform of Africa’s 
business climate, considering these features.   Minority and foreign investors have far higher 
productivity and a greater propensity to export; however, Africa’s difficult business climate and 
the tendency to overcome it by working in ethnic networks slows new entry and may decrease 
the incentives of key parts of the business community to form an aggressive pressure group for 
reform. This increases the possibility that countries settle into a low-productivity equilibrium. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings for reforms to boost the competitiveness 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Developing countries were traditionally considered to be primary exporters but that stereotype 
has long faded: by 2002, 60 percent of their exports were manufactured goods. The technology 
content of developing country exports has also been rising rapidly, especially in Asia, which has 
seen the emergence of dynamic regional trading networks. Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa) 
has lagged in this process of economic diversification; with the exceptions of South Africa and 
Mauritius, manufacturing and processing capacity remains modest. Slow progress in economic 
diversification and technological upgrading has been associated with weak private sector 
development, lagging incomes, falling behind in terms of development outcomes, and 
marginalization of Africa on the world trading stage.   
 
This paper draws on a number of firm surveys undertaken for the World Bank’s Investment 
Climate Assessments (ICAs) to better understand some of  the factors underlying Africa’s slow 
industrial growth.  Although a number of studies have used firm surveys to analyze productivity 
determinants in Africa (Biggs et al. 1995; Collier et al. 2000; Fafchamps 2004; Mengistae and 
Pattillo 2002; see also the extensive RPED studies, 1995-present), it is now possible to combine 
expanded coverage in Africa with comparisons to other low income countries that have managed 
to effect the transition to manufacturing exporter status. This paper does not cover all factors that 
affect competitiveness, but attempts to analyze the cost structure of firms in Africa relative to 
those in competitor regions.  It also interprets comparative firm data to consider why reform 
tends to be difficult and slow in Africa. 
 
Section 2 of the paper reviews three theories of comparative advantage that offer different, 
and relevant, perspectives on Africa’s slow diversification. The first stresses the role of factor 
endowments in shaping economic structure and the composition of trade; the second focuses 
on the ability of countries to provide public goods to the investment community in the form 
of a stable and low-cost business climate: the third emphasizes the important role of firm 
entry in creating a critical mass of industries able to reap knowledge and other dynamic scale 
externalities.   Taken together, the latter two theories suggest powerful externalities 
associated with conglomeration effects, but also that these will be hard to achieve in the 
absence of a low-cost business environment.   Deviations of  countries’ price levels relative 
to those derived from predicted purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors confirm 
that Africa indeed appears to be a high-cost region.   
 
Section 3 turns to the firm-level investment climate (IC) surveys and assesses the performance 
gap between Africa and its competitors.  As well as estimating conventional total factor 
productivity, we define a concept of net total factor productivity (TFP) and consider the 
contributions of factory-floor productivity, indirect costs, and certain business environment–
related losses to overall differentials in competitiveness.  Our data suggest that these losses and 
indirect costs  are crucial determinants of competitiveness..  
 
Section 4 considers the implications of ethnic and size/efficiency cleavages in Africa’s business 
sectors for the political economy of business-related reforms.  Doing Business 2005 (World Bank 
2004b) places Africa low on business climate indicators and as a laggard in reform relative to 
other regions. If, as suggested by the recent World Development Report 2005 (World Bank 
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2004a), the business climate is so important for growth and development, why have African 
countries been so slow to improve it?  Part of the reason is the particular severity of physical 
constraints in Africa, but equally important is the configuration of political interests for and 
against reforms in areas related to the business climate. Section 4 considers survey evidence 
from the perspective of ethnicity, highlighting the fracturing of business interests along ethnic 
and domestic/foreign lines, and the tradeoffs for firms (especially the larger ones) between the 
gains from a better business climate and the losses from the competitive entry that improvements 
are likely to encourage. It is argued that these factors weaken the ability, and perhaps also the 
motivation, of the business community to press for a better business climate, and that this 
compounds the ambivalent attitude toward business expressed in Afrobarometer surveys and 
reflected in statements by many prominent African officials. These factors raise the question of 
whether to attempt reforms across-the-board or to sequence them to create pockets of 
opportunity that in turn can build constituencies for wider reforms.  
 
Section 5 concludes with a summary of policy implications as well as thoughts on further areas 
of research.    
 
 
2.  COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND COSTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
  2.1  Three  Approaches to Comparative Advantage 
 
As noted long ago by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and others, development and structural 
change are closely associated, so that growth largely involves the introduction of new, higher-
value-added activities and products rather than simply the expansion of old ones. In the initial 
stages, this involves the relative contraction of low-productivity agriculture and the rise in the 
share of industry. Similarly, overall growth within the industrial sector is the aggregation of 
repeated industry cycles of take-off, maturation, and stagnation (or migration to less advanced 
countries), with more productive economies advancing up the technological ladder. Trade theory 
is central to understanding economic structure and structural change because countries will tend 
to export goods that they can make most cheaply and efficiently relative to other countries. And 
because sustained economic growth is driven by the emergence of new economic activities—
rather than the perpetual scaling-up of old activities—trade theory is also key to understanding 
growth.  
 
Wood and Berge (1997) and Wood and Mayer (2001) compare Africa’s factor endowments with 
those of other regions. With capital assumed mobile in the long run, relative endowments of 
skills and land (resources) per capita are shown to have a strong relationship with the 
composition of exports. Countries higher up the skills/land spectrum export more manufactures 
relative to processed or primary goods and a larger proportion of higher-technology 
manufactures.  A pessimistic view based on these results would argue that Africa’s scant human 
capital and rich natural resource base ensures that manufactured exports will always be 
unprofitable. 
 
These theories do not, however, fully account for Africa’s low income level despite its resource 
abundance; neither do they explain the dynamic path of factor accumulation (pervasive financial 
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and human capital flight) which has shaped Africa today.
1   Krugman (1980, 1981, 1983) shows 
that comparative advantage is also a function of differences in productivity and costs that do not 
derive from relative factor abundance. The main effects here can be expressed through two 
approaches, one relating to business-environmental factors and the other to dynamic economies 
of scale.  
 
The business environment may be defined as the nexus of policies, institutions, physical 
infrastructure, human resources, and geographic features that influence the efficiency with which 
different firms and industries operate.
2 At firm level,it directly influences costs of production; at 
the industry level, it often relates to market structure and competition. Its impact is felt more 
heavily in traded sectors that are not particularly intensive in natural resources (that is, 
manufacturing, high-value services) than in primary production and extractive resource sectors 
because the former tend to more intensively require “inputs” of logistics, infrastructure, and 
regulation (Collier 2000). The combination of macroeconomic instability, crime and poor 
security, a weak and politicized financial system, shoddy local roads and electricity systems, 
high transport costs, and predatory local officials will have relatively little influence on the 
productivity and costs of offshore oil industries but will be devastating for small-scale and 
medium-scale manufacturing. Even efficient firms able to transform inputs into outputs with 
high efficiency and low “factory-floor” costs can be driven out of business by a poor business 
environment.  
 
Dynamic economies of scale generated by learning processes, network effects, and industry-
specific spillovers represent a further elaboration beyond classical production and trade theory 
(Krugman 1980, 1991). Evidence suggests that dynamic scale economies play a considerable 
role in shaping the structure of production, as illustrated by path dependence in the development 
of individual industries, the “lumpy” nature of growth in a particular product across countries 
(for example, high degrees of specialization in narrow industrial lines; see Burgess and Venables 
2004) and within countries (for example, urbanization, industrial clusters, and path-dependence 
in the development of individual industries; see Krugman 1991).   But individual firms do not 
internalize the social value of the potential economies of scale from their entry into a particular 
industry.  Thus entry, investment, and the development of new industries are still dependent on 
the quality of the business environment, good policies, and sound infrastructure (Collier 2000), 
incentives provided by competition in an appropriate institutional setting (Olofin 2002; 
Grossman and Helpman 1990), and geographic advantages and disadvantages (Krugman 1991).
3 
Business environments do not have to be perfect, but they have to be good enough on a number 
                                                 
1 For estimates of financial and human capital flight, see Collier et al. (1999).  It is also worth pointing out that while 
land is abundant, distortions in the regulatory and legal environments have resulted in very high prices for land in 
many countries. 
2 For more discussion  see World Development Report 2005 (World Bank 2004a) and the series of Investment 
Climate Assessments put out by the World Bank from 1999 to 2004. See also http://www.worldbank.org/rped and 
http://www.fias.net. 
3 Also, Montobbio (2002) has analyzed structural change from the perspective of evolutionary economics. He finds 
that with firm-level heterogeneity in unit costs, sorting and selection driven by competition and product 
substitutability drive a process of structural change. Although this approach has very different analytical foundations 
than endogenous growth and trade theory, one of its fundamental insights—that an economy’s relatively more 
productive firms and sectors tend to become more important over time—is similar. 
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of crucial dimensions to stimulate investment and competition sufficient to launch the self-
reinforcing process of industrial growth. 
 
This theoretical framework offers insights beyond those of classical trade theory for 
understanding patterns of trade and industrialization. First, while many resource-rich countries 
have been unable to move past primary products, other notable cases with good policies (Chile, 
Malaysia, Australia, United States) have built high value-added resource processing industries in 
the early stages of industrialization, using these as a springboard to even higher-value activities. 
Second, the broad factor-based specialization predicted by classical trade theory does not map 
well onto reality. Countries with similar factor endowments often export different products, and 
often to each other. Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) studied U.S.-bound exports from Bangladesh, 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Korea, and Taiwan at a very fine level of disaggregation, 
finding that exports are characterized by specialization in a narrow range of activities with 
surprisingly little overlap across countries. Indeed, African examples of new industries such as 
Kenya’s horticulture-floriculture sector and the garment sectors of Madagascar and Lesotho also 
suggest the importance of industrial clustering.   
 
Pessimistic evaluations of the prospects of diversification and growth in resource-rich countries, 
miss part of the story.
4 African countries often suffer from poor policies, weak institutions, and 
shoddy infrastructure (see Collier and Gunning 1997, Eifert and Ramachandran 2004). High 
transport costs and sparseness are also important (Venables and Limao 1994; Winters and 
Martins 2004): Gross domestic product (GDP) per square kilometer in Africa (excluding South 
Africa) is one-tenth the level in Latin America and one-twentieth that in India. Manufacturing 
value added per hectare (excluding South Africa) is only 1.2 percent that of China: moreover, the 
GDP of the median country, is  barely $3 billion, suggesting that effort to overcome high 
regulatory costs will not be rewarded by large market potential. These factors increase costs, 
depress productivity, discourage investment, and hence obstruct the self-reinforcing processes of 
growth, clustering, and dynamic economies of scale. Within Africa, productivity is strongly 
related to exports, both as a cause and as a consequence (Collier et al. 2000; Soderbom and Teal 
2003). But most African firms simply are not productive enough to export manufactures. 
Africa’s factor endowment may be consistent with competitiveness in a variety of labor-intensive 
natural resource processing industries. However, most African countries have been unable to 
take even this step toward higher value-added processing. 
 
2. 2 Are African Countries Really High Cost?  Macroeconomic Evidence.   
 
PPP conversion factors—here expressed as the ratio of a country’s GDP measured in market 
prices to its income measured in PPP prices—provide an estimate of its aggregate price level 
relative to those of other countries. This ratio ranges from less than 0.2 in some poor countries to 
1 or higher in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (see 
table 2.1). Unfortunately, the price deflators for PPP calculations were last updated for the 1993–
                                                 
4 These include the Wood and Mayer (2001) argument that Africa’s skill deficit and relative abundance in natural 
resources condemns the continent to primary product exports for the foreseeable future. 
6 Linkage between Africa and other regions proceeded through price comparisons with the United States for a 
limited range of products, not always perfectly matched in terms of quality.  China and India were linked through 
regression procedures based on income and secondary education.   
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1996 period, so this picture is ten years old and some countries may look different today. 
Further, although survey coverage was quite widespread in Africa and within other regions, the 
global linkages were weak as was the linkage for some important comparators, notably India and 
China. The global relativities of PPP deflators are therefore subject to considerable error and 
potential biases, in directions unknown. A new round of data collection is under way, but it will 
take some time for this effort to be completed.
6
 
PPP conversion factors are closely related to income levels due to the “Balassa Effect”—
productivity gaps between rich and poor countries are larger in tradeables sectors than in 
nontradeables, while rich countries also have higher demand for nontraded goods and services. 
Nontraded goods and services therefore tend to be relatively more costly in rich countries. 
International trade tends to equalize prices of traded goods so that aggregate price-level 
differences tend to be driven by the prices of nontraded goods, although the final prices of most 
tradeable goods will also be affected by trade restrictions and the prices of inputs such as port 
services and domestic transport. For manufacturing firms, higher traded goods prices will impact 
competitiveness through the cost of imported capital equipment and raw materials, while higher 
nontraded goods prices will do so through a wide range of indirect costs: transport, logistics, 
electricity, telecommunications, rent, security, and so forth. 
 
With per capita incomes averaging $300, Africa’s poor economies have only four-fifths the 
income level of South Asia and one-half that of East Asia. But from PPP conversion factors, 
their costs are 75 percent and 35 percent higher, respectively, than those for these two regions..  
Table 2.1 compares actual to predicted costs. Africa’s poor countries are 31 percent more costly 
than predicted, whereas China and South Asia (India, primarily) are 20 percent and 13 percent 
below their predicted levels, respectively.
7   These results are broadly compatible with the 
estimates from Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2003) that show that capital costs are one-third higher 
than world levels in Africa and one-third lower than world levels in Asia. These results may also 
reflect the price of land, which is often surprisingly high in Africa.  But they suggest that cost 













Table 2.1: Ratio of Exchange Rate to PPP Conversion Factor, by Region, 1993–96 
 
 OECD  LAC  MENA  ECA  EAP  SAR  SSA 
                                                 
7 As noted above, these estimates are subject to considerable error.   
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     All China  All Poor
a
Costs 1.19  0.64  0.46  0.55  0.42  0.42  0.29  0.23  0.22  0.37  0.31 
Ratio of costs to 




26,500 4,000  2,850  3,200  2,200 2,450 750  550  375 550 300 
* A value of 1 implies that cost levels are equal t those predicted by the Balassa trend-line relating income level to 
PPP ratios.  Regions with costs or prices higher than predicted have values above 1.   




Moving to country level, while income explains 90 percent of the cross-country variation in price 
levels, some countries lie substantially above or below the regression line.  Even the noisy PPP 
data shows some systematic patterns. The most deviant outlier is the Republic of Congo, an oil-
producing country with a record of political instability, poor governance and economic 
management, low capacity, poverty and high inequality, and relatively far from major 
international markets. Despite the country’s modest per capita income ($750 at market prices), 
market prices for goods and services are close to OECD levels (ER/PPP is 0.80). Table 2.2 
illustrates countries’ price levels and their deviations from the Balassa income-price curve. Many 
strong performers lie well below the regression line—most of these countries have effected the 
transition to manufactured exporter status and have created a critical mass of industrial activities 
able to take advantage of cheap local inputs to lower costs for other firms and consumers alike. 
This pattern also holds within Africa: price levels in Africa’s better-performing countries, 
including South Africa and Mauritius which have shifted from primary to manufactured exports, 
are also close to predicted values. Countries above the line are typically weak performers, and 
most are still at primary exporting stage.  
 
Table 2.2 divides countries below $1,000 per capita into low, moderate, and major 
manufacturing exporters and reports cost levels and deviations from the Balassa curve. There are 
exceptions, but the pattern is quite strong. It suggests that countries with high costs have low 
efficiency in producing a wide range of nontraded goods and services that serve directly as 
intermediate inputs to production or that underpin the efficient provision of services, such as 
finance, which are essential for production. As countries move progressively down the efficiency 
frontier, the costs to manufacturing firms of obtaining these inputs rise, which squeezes their 
value added between rising overall costs and the price at which their products can be imported. 
Few firms can insulate themselves from high domestic costs: In extreme cases, the economy 
retreats into a combination of subsistence agriculture and concentrated hydrocarbon or hard-
mining activities able to shield themselves from economy-wide effects.
8   
 
If the costs facing many African firms are even close to these estimates, they will impact on 
competitiveness.  In addition, to the extent that households and workers also face high prices, the 
                                                 
8 Technology can sometimes enable a wider range of firms to overcome high domestic cost structures.  Installing 
their own communications systems enabled Indian software and data-processing firms to bypass ineffective and 
costly telecommunications systems and build on a strong base of cheap, highly-trained, English-speaking labor.  But 
such cases are likely to be rare.   
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market value of their wages and incomes overstates their purchasing power relative to 
households in other poor, but low-cost, countries. African firms may therefore face relatively 
high wage costs for firms, but African workers see relatively low purchasing power.  Of course, 
especially given the limited accuracy of the PPP data, this highly aggregated exercise is only 
indicative.  The next section analyzes microeconomic evidence at the firm level, which throws 
more light on the nature of high business costs in Africa.   
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Table 2.2: Costs and Export Structure, Countries under $1,000 per Capita, 1993–96 
 
Country  Manufacturing 
%  exports  ER:PPP Balassa 
gap
a Country  Manufacturing 
%  exports  ER:PPP  Balassa 
gap
a
Major exporters  69  0.25  0.78  Neglible exporters 4  0.51  1.48 
Nicaragua  33.7  0.19 0.60  Sudan  2.8  0.23 0.66 
Vietnam  —  0.20 0.67  Guinea-Bissau  0.2  0.23 0.95 
India  72.4  0.21 0.68  Burundi  1.3  0.24 0.96 
Ukraine  67.8  0.24 0.65  Togo  5.8  0.25 0.80 
China  84.4  0.24 0.73  Niger  0.5  0.29 1.02 
Bangladesh  87.2  0.26 0.86  Mauritania  0.4  0.30 0.72 
Haiti  76.7  0.26 0.76  Burkina  Faso  4.4  0.30 1.02 
Pakistan  83.8  0.27 0.96  Angola  —  0.31 0.79 
Sri  Lanka  72.5  0.29 0.85  Nigeria  1.1  0.37 1.19 
Kyrgyz  Republic  38.4  0.33 1.06  Mali  2.1  0.40 1.36 
       Cameroon  8.0  0.41  1.24 
Moderate exporters  19  0.30  1.01  Papua New Guinea 4.0  0.45  1.17 
Ethiopia  11.2  0.18 1.18  Benin  3.7  0.47 1.54 
Ghana  13.2  0.23 0.75  Malawi  8.6  0.48 1.21 
Gambia,  The  19.6  0.23 0.78  Zambia  7.0  0.48 1.79 
Azerbaijan  20.0  0.25 0.77  Cote  d'Ivoire  6.1  0.56 1.64 
Rwanda  13.8  0.24 0.92  Yemen,  Rep.  0.6  0.71 1.38 
Mozambique 16.7  0.25  0.97  Congo,  Rep. 2.7  0.72  2.3 
Uganda 13.0  0.27  1.03         
Comoros 33.4  0.29  0.91         
Honduras 23.6  0.29  0.91         
Madagascar 15.1  0.29  1.08         
Moldova 20.3  0.30  1.09         
Mongolia 10.2  0.30  0.97         
Guinea 20.1  0.32  1.06         
Kenya 26.4  0.34  1.12         
Notes: Export data are not available for Vietnam and Angola. Vietnam’s manufacturing sector accounts for 20 
percent of GDP; Angola’s accounts for 4 percent of GDP.  
a. A value of 1 implies that a country’s cost or price level is as predicted by the regression line relating price and 
income levels.    
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
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3.   FIRM COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM INVESTMENT 
 CLIMATE  SURVEYS 
 
This section turns to the microeconomic data gathered by the World Bank’s Investment Climate 
firm surveys over the 2001–2004 period.
9  We consider a range of losses and indirect costs that 
are estimated in these surveys, and show that they represent a significant drag on manufacturing 
competitiveness which often escapes attention in the literature on growth and firm performance. 
There are other types of costs and risks which are related to the business environments that are 
beyond the scope of this paper (see World Bank, World Development Report, 2005).   
 
3.1  Countries and the Surveys 
 
Our cross-sectional data cover 15 countries: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, and as comparators Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, India, 
Morocco, and Nicaragua. We have data for around 7,000 firms in six industry categories 
(textiles, garments, and leather; food and beverage processing; metals and machinery; chemicals 
and paints; wood and furniture; and other). Of these firms, around 2,700 are in Africa and 1,800 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is a fairly large spread across firm size groups, although in the 
African and Latin American cases, more firms are micro, small, and medium enterprises relative 
to samples in Bangladesh and China. 
 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the economies considered here. The Sub-Saharan African 
countries (hereafter referred to as “African”) are small and generally poorer, along with India 
and Bangladesh, and tend to be more agrarian. Investment rates also tend to be lower, although 
Mozambique and Eritrea recently benefited from large investments. Manufacturing sectors in 
African countries tend to be modest with very low exports—the manufacturing share of 
merchandise exports is two-thirds or more in China, Bangladesh, and Morocco relative to the 
average of 15 percent for African countries.   
 
There are also important differences between the African countries. The surveys in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea took place in the aftermath of a damaging conflict; this particularly affected Eritrea’s 
economy, with continuing conscription creating severe labor shortages. By closing off access to 
Eritrean ports, the conflict also exacerbated the long-standing isolation of Ethiopia’s economy, 
where state control of private activity is pervasive, with low levels of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), a high prevalence of “party-statal” firms, and a degree of tension between the government 
and the traditionally Amharic investment community.  
 
Nigeria also has been subject to considerable instability, and its oil-dominated economy has 
suffered from extremely poor governance and has not yet seen a major period of opening. These 
three economies are distinctive enough that we would be surprised to find “normal” results. In 
contrast, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia share a recent legacy of 
wide-ranging policies to open their economies to trade and foreign investment. Of these, only 
Senegal and Kenya have avoided severe disruption to their established business communities 
                                                 
9 For more information, visit http://www.worldbank.org/rped or http://rru.worldbank.org. 
11 Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda are rated in the top tercile in Africa by the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments (CPIA).  Mozambique is also well rated, but weaker in some areas, esp. financial sector.   
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since independence, whether through revolutions and civil conflict (Uganda, Mozambique) or 
phases of socialist development and widespread nationalization (Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia). In this group, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda would be considered as the 
better managed,
11 with Kenya suffering from an extended period of poor governance and Zambia 
having experienced an extended period of inconsistent reforms, macroinstability, and a series of 
controversial privatizations that strained relations among the government, donors, and a business 




Table 3.1. Selected Economic Indicators, 2000–2002 












Capital per worker 
in mfg, $ median 
Eritrea 160  111  21  39  (5.3)  8  (5.4)  -  20,600 
Ethiopia 100  49  52  18  (1.2)  7  (5.0)  9.8  2,350 
Nigeria 290  81  35  20  (2.4) 4  (3.7) 0.2  20,200 
Kenya  360  57  19  14 (0.4)  13 (1.0)  22  9,150 
Mozambique  210  79  23  40 (8.6)  13 (9.2)  7.5  5,400 
Senegal  480  38  18  18 (1.3)  13 (7.3)  37  8,900 
Tanzania 280  71  45  17  (3.7)  8  (5.9)  18  3,350 
Uganda  250  40  31  20 (2.6)  10 (2.9)  6.5  1,800 
Zambia  330  75  22  18 (2.9)  11 (4.5)  17  8,000 
China  940  52  15  37 (3.7)  38 (8.7)  88  6,700 
Bangladesh  380  33  23  23 (0.3)  16 (5.6)  92  1,050 
India  480  31  23  22 (0.6)  15 (5.6)  77  2,050 
Morocco  1,190  66  16  25 (4.2)  17 (4.0)  64  8,050 
Bolivia  900  49  15  16 (9.3)  15 (1.9)  17  5,650 
Nicaragua  720  73  18  29 (5.0)  14 (1.2)  13  2,450 
Sources: Investment Climate Surveys (capital/worker) and World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
 
3.2  Estimates of Gross and Net Total Factor Productivity: Africa in Comparative 
Perspective 
 
This section compares the performance of African firms with those in a number of comparator 
countries.   We begin with technical efficiency or (gross) productivity, a common focus in the 
literature, but then  broaden the discussion.  We first note the effect of business-environment 
related losses, identified in the surveys as percentages of sales, that depress productivity, and 
then consider the cost of energy as well as a range of indirect costs such as transport, telecom, 
security, land, bribes, marketing etc, which are not often considered in the analysis of TFP.   We 
argue that netting out these costs from value-added yields a concept of “net value added” and a 
corresponding measure of “net total factor productivity,” which comes closer to influencing  
profitability.  This broader view of firm performance, which extends beyond the traditional 
emphasis on factory-floor productivity and labor costs, is important to understanding economic 
outcomes in Africa. Together with the losses that depress (gross) productivity, indirect costs 
associated with operating expenses—energy, transport, telecom, security, land, bribes, 
marketing, and so on—represent a heavy drag on net productivity and profitability in most 
African countries in our sample and serve as a brake on competitiveness.   
                                                 
12 For a comparative review of some of these countries see Devarajan et al. (2001).   
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It is important to note that earlier analyses of firm survey data from Africa also attempted to 
account for indirect costs when measuring value added of firms (Biggs, Shah and Srivastava, 
1995).  However, due to lack of availability of comparator data outside Africa, these studies were 
not able to place Africa in a global perspective.  In this paper,  we use direct cost accounting as 
well as econometric techniques to investigate productivity and losses and costs, across African 
and non-African countries and to highlight their respective impact.  In doing so, we do our best 
to deal with a number of confounding issues, including price differences across countries.  No 
previous dataset that we are aware of has provided the level of detail on sales, costs, and inputs 
to reliably document these issues and study their implications.  
 
Gross (Factory-Floor) Productivity  
 
Much firm-level research focuses on productivity, examining differences in physical output 
produced for a given quantity of inputs. Econometric analyses of productivity often use data on 
the value of sales and inputs to estimate TFP, a “factory-floor” concept associated with firms’ 
capacity to translate inputs into outputs. In the Cobb-Douglass form, the natural log of TFP is 
often estimated in the following manner:   
 
[1]  i i i i i i L K M Y A δZ − − − − = ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( β α  
 
where A is (in our terminology) gross TFP, Y is sales revenue, M is raw materials, K is capital, L 
is labor, α is the capital share, β is the labor share, χ is the materials share, Z is a vector of sector 
and country dummies and interaction effects, and δ the corresponding vector of parameters.
13  In 
equation 1, Y-M  is (gross) value added.  This approach, sometimes estimated in Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) or translog form, or augmented in order to address endogeneity 
concerns, is the classic approach to firm performance at the micro level.   
Many analyses of African industry have focused on total factor productivity (TFP), including the 
World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessments and several analyses carried out using African 
firm survey data from the 1990s (World Bank 2001-2004; Biggs, Srivastava, and Shah, 1995; 
Soderbom and Teal 2003). These analyses suggest that average TFP tends to be quite low in 
African firms. Skills and human capital shortages and technology gaps are possible reasons for 
this problem. The IC surveys also suggest that hostile business environments depress firm sales 
due to losses related to infrastructure and service shortcomings, as discussed below. 
 
Our data strongly support the proposition that gross TFP is lower on average in most African 
countries than in their higher-performing counterparts in the developing world. We estimated 
                                                 
13 The usual concern is that a firm i, knowing its level of productivity Ai, will choose to use more flexible inputs (for 
example, Li and Mi), so the OLS (ordinary least squares) estimates of α and β will be biased. Methods of dealing 
with the problem include obtaining panel data (a moot point for our analysis), instrumental variables (which has 
shortcomings), and structural approaches taken by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (forthcoming), 
which are subject to substantial problems (Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2005).  We acknowledge the theoretical 
issues but are not trying to replicate these approaches in our analysis. 
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this for our pooled sample of 15 countries, using a number of techniques to deal with some of the 
estimation and robustness issues.
14   
 
One of the main estimation issues is the issue of relative prices. Firms in different countries (or 
even different sectors or regions within a given country) likely face different prices for their 
outputs and for capital and intermediate inputs.
15   For instance, firms in remote areas may on the 
one hand receive rents from natural protection and market domination and on the other hand, pay 
high prices for capital equipment and raw materials.  Productivity will appear higher where 
output prices are inflated and will appear lower where capital goods prices are inflated. To 
enable sensitivity analyses of the impact of pricing differences, we combine our data on 
aggregate price levels from Section 2 with information on the relative prices of investment and 
consumption goods from Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2003). We adjust capital inputs using 
investment good prices and outputs using consumption good prices.
16
 
Production function estimates from our gross TFP estimations shown in Table 3.2 indicate that  
the shares of capital and labor range across sectors from 0.26-0.40 and 0.58-0.86 respectively. 
Constant returns to scale cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level in any sector. Productivity 
differentials among sectors are large and in some cases significant; food and beverages and wood 
and furniture firms appear particularly productive, whereas metals and machinery firms appear 
less so. Alternative estimations (available on request) using translog production functions and 
stochastic frontier methods produce very similar results. 
 
Using equation 1, we convert the residuals to an index of TFP relative to China, and report the 
results in Figure 3.1.  African countries exhibit a wide range of productivity relate to the average 
TFP of China. 
17  Indian, and Moroccan firms appear to be the best performers, followed by their 
                                                 
14 One question of potential concern is the possibility of systematic bias in the response rates to questions on sales 
and costs.
 Response rates do differ across countries, but within countries they are remarkably uniform across 
categories of firms—domestic/foreign, ethnic/indigenous, exporter/nonexporter—that are known to correlate 
strongly with productivity.  The only strong pattern in response rates is that micro firms (those with less than ten 
employees) tend to respond less often, which suggests that response rates to detailed sales and costs questions may 
have more to do with accounting and capacity.  Fieldwork experience does suggest that minority firms, in particular, 
are likely to understate sales.  If true, this will tend to accentuate the ethnic productivity gaps shown by the data.  
Although selection bias is always a concern in any survey, we think it unlikely to pose a major problem for the 
broad pattern of results.  
 
 
15 For instance, firms in remote areas with poor transport systems may on the one hand receive rents from natural 
protection and market domination and on the other pay high prices for capital equipment and raw materials.  
16 A second and related point is that firms with substantial product-market power likely face higher output prices and 
thus artificially appear to be more productive. Causation also runs in the other direction—more productive firms will 
likely win a larger share of their markets— so an appropriate approach for controlling for market power requires a 
multi-stage instrumental variables approach. Unfortunately, the quality of the market share data and the availability 
of instruments are poor. We have performed production function estimations with a very imperfect measure—self-
reported market share--included directly as an independent variable; the pooled results suggest that the combined 
relationship (with causation in both directions) is strong, with the difference between near-zero market share and 
25% (50%) market share associated with an output price differential of 9% (13%), and is much stronger in some 
African countries. 
17To understand the effect of the price corrections, we re-estimated using nominal prices. The results in adjusted 
prices are perhaps a better reflection of underlying firm characteristics; the results in nominal prices may be a better 
reflection of how firms are actually doing in the sense that the local price levels determine profits, holding firm 
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Senegalese, Nicaraguan, and Kenyan counterparts, which are in the range of 75-80 percent of 
Chinese productivity. Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Bolivia follow in the range of 
45-60 percent, and Zambia, Eritrea, and Mozambique are in the range of only 30-35 percent of 
Chinese firms  (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1).  These results are in line with most previous findings. 
 
Table 3.2. Results of Equations [1], OLS, Adjusted Prices 
 
 Ã  [1] 
 Coefficient  Std  error 
Constant 4.38  0.23 
Log Capital  0.40  0.02 
Log Labor  0.66  0.04 
Bangladesh 1.11  0.11 
Bolivia 0.96  0.13 
China 1.53  0.11 
Eritrea 0.43  0.19 
Ethiopia 0.69  0.13 
India 1.62  0.11 
Kenya 1.20  0.14 
Morocco 1.46  0.11 
Mozambique 0.38  0.18 
Nicaragua 1.21  0.12 
Nigeria 0.67  0.15 
Senegal 1.30  0.15 
Tanzania 1.08  0.14 
Uganda 0.80  0.14 
Chemicals 0.27  0.35 
Food & beverage  0.67  0.29 
Metals & machinery  -0.06  0.31 
Textiles, garments & leather  0.21  0.28 
Wood & furniture  0.74  0.40 
L*ch (interaction)  0.11  0.06 
L*fb 0.07  0.05 
L*m 0.04  0.05 
L*tgl -0.12  0.04 
L*w 0.20  0.08 
K*ch -0.04  0.03 
K*fb -0.07  0.03 
K*m -0.02  0.03 
K*tgl -0.14  0.03 




Notes: Omitted country: Zambia. Omitted sector: other. Re-estimation without the “other” firms makes little 
difference to coefficients on factors or country dummy variables. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
characteristics constant. The patterns in the results are similar, but countries with high price levels (especially 
Zambia, Senegal, and Tanzania) appear somewhat stronger using nominal figures. 
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Results of Previous Analyses of  African Productivity 
 
Previous studies suggest that while factory-floor productivity is relatively low in many African 
countries, it is not low enough (relative to wages) to explain the continent’s weak manufacturing 
competitiveness. For instance, in a study of garment industries, Cadot and Nasir (2001) find that 
the countries with the lowest factory-floor labor productivity (Mozambique and Ghana) are at 
roughly half the level of China, but that this differential is more than made up by lower wages 
(see table 3.3). If factory-floor productivity is the bottom line for competitiveness, garment firms 
in Madagascar, Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, and Lesotho might dominate those in Chinese 
export-processing zones, with 40-60 percent of the physical unit labor costs (per men’s casual 
shirt).  
 
These findings mirror earlier work by Biggs et al. (1995), which suggests that African firms are 
well placed to compete on labor costs. Gelb and Tidrick (2000) cite evidence on the cost 
structures of African firms in the 1990s, suggesting that labor costs are a relatively small share of 
total costs (less than 20 percent) and that other types of costs may be more important. Eifert and 
Ramachandran (2004) note that the ratio of labor costs to value added at the firm level (a 
common proxy for unit labor costs) has less predictive power than previously suggested with 
respect to manufacturing performance at the country level within Africa.
18 This finding indicates 
that the focus on factory-floor productivity and labor costs might be too narrow. 
 
                                                 
18 The “most competitive” countries using this benchmark appear to be Eritrea and Nigeria, whereas Mauritius 
(Africa’s only major manufacturing success story) and Uganda (which has experienced rapid growth in 
manufacturing over the 1990s) have relatively high unit labor costs.  
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Table 3.3. Factory-Floor Productivity and Labor Costs in Garment Assembly 
 
  Men’s casual shirts per machine 
operator per day 
Semi-skilled machine operator 
monthly wage  Labor cost per shirt 
Madagascar 14-15  $55-65  $0.16 
Kenya 12-15  $60-65  $0.18 
Ghana 12  $30-45  $0.12 
Mozambique 10-11  $40-50  $0.16 
Lesotho 18 $82-95  $0.19 
South Africa  15  $255  $0.65 
India 16  $70-75  $0.17 
EPZ China  18-22  $150  $0.29 
Source: Cadot and Nasir (2001) 
 
 
Much of the literature on the business environment spurred by the IC surveys has focused on 
explaining variation in (gross) TFP using “hard” (non-perceptions-based) indicators in areas such 
as infrastructure quality, regulatory burden, and product market competition.
19 On the one hand, 
studies that exclude country fixed effects find large effects of business environment variables on 
TFP (Batsos and Nasir 2004). However, the problem of unobserved variables is vast: any 
explanatory variable that differs enough between Africa and its higher-performing comparators 
produces large, significant effects. The indirect nature of potential linkages between business 
environment variables and TFP further compounds the omitted variables problem. On the other 
hand, studies that include fixed effects find a lesser role for business environment variables 
(Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae 2003). In the case of variables that are essentially 
cross-country in nature (such as port quality), identification is very difficult. Pooled multi-
country estimations—even those that include country dummies—are limited in understanding the 
complex interactions of the explanatory variables. If the binding constraints on firm performance 
vary across countries, there is no reason to expect similar-magnitude effects of individual 
business environment components across countries.
20 In general, while further econometric on 
firm-level TFP with a set of business environment variables on the right hand side may advance 
the state of our knowledge, we take a different approach, first considering the impact of losses in 
reducing TFP and then including indirect costs available as percentages of sales.  This does not 
include all business environment-related costs, risks and losses, but provides some idea of how 








                                                 
19 Some of this literature focuses on the propensity to export and finds this to be strongly correlated with 
productivity measures (Clarke 2004; Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae 2003).  
20 In our data, productivity regressions on BE variables such as time to enforce a contract, number of inspector 
visits, and the percentage of senior management time spent dealing with regulation do not produce strong results. 
21 Recent work by Escribano and Guasch (2005) provides useful methodological bases that point in this direction. 
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The Impact of Direct Losses on Factory-Floor Productivity 
 
The investment climate surveys provide information on a range of  business losses which are 
helpful in understanding productivity shortfalls. One example is losses due to power outages.  
Variants of the following question were widely asked: “What percent of annual sales did you 
lose last year due to power outages or surges from the public grid? Please include losses due to 
lost production time from the outage, time needed to reset machines, and production ruined due 
to processes being interrupted.” Similar questions were asked about problems with 
infrastructure-related issues such delays in logistics, and transport failures, all areas that may be 
plausibly interpreted as costs to the firm (that is, production or sales revenue would have been 
higher if the failures had not occurred).  Our data indicate that losses due to shipping delays or 
holdups at ports are significant in some countries.  Unfortunately only losses due to power 
failures are systematically available for all the countries in our sample. 
 
African firms report substantially higher losses than their counterparts in higher-performing 
countries (Figure 3.2) , which translates into a corresponding decline in measured productivity. 
This result also holds up when regressing the log of gross TFP on losses from power outages.  
From our data, the coefficient is roughly 0.01, so a reported loss of 1 percent of sales is 
statistically associated with 1 percent lower gross TFP.  A substantial portion of the variance in 
measured productivity between China and several African countries (especially Zambia, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania) can be attributed to infrastructure and logistics-related 
losses rather than their intrinsic capabilities. In Kenya, losses from power failure amount to 6% 
of sales for the median firm; in China, they are only 1% of sales.  Interestingly, power failure is 




                                                 
22 Further econometric on firm-level TFP with a set of business environment variables on the right hand side may 
advance the state of our knowledge on productivity (Escribano and Guasch, 2005).  
 
28 We recognize that transport costs are often not included in measures of productivity because they do not directly 
affect the productivity of the firm. Our estimation of net value added lies somwhere between the strict definitions of 
productivity and profitability and consequently, we include the full set of indirect costs faced by the firm. 
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The Impact of Indirect  Costs on Productivity 
 
We now focus on a range of indirect costs identified in various degrees of detail in the surveys.  
Table 3.4 displays the breakdown of indirect costs for each country at the level of detail available 
(some surveys have more disaggregated costs than others). Energy is consistently the largest 
component of indirect costs, averaging around one-third of the total. Transport tends to follow in 
the range of 5-15 percent, land costs cluster at around 10 percent, telecom and security in the 
range of 2-8 percent, and water at around 2 percent.
28 Marketing is often a significant cost (8-16 
percent) where it is known. A range of items fall under the heading “other costs,” which typically 
includes items such as insurance, office supplies, travel costs, accounting, maintenance, and 
spare parts. This breakdown shows the relatively large burden of infrastructure and public 
services—energy, transport, telecom, water, and security costs—that together account for more 
than half of all costs described in this table. 
 
Figure 3.3 provides a cross-country comparison of firms’ cost structures, including labor (wages, 
benefits), capital (interest, finance charges, machine depreciation), raw materials, and other 
indirect costs. In strong performers such as China, India, Nicaragua, Bangladesh, Morocco, and 
Senegal, the combination of energy and indirect costs are 13-15 percent of total costs, around 
half the level of labor costs. In contrast, this combination in most African countries accounts for 
20-30 percent of total costs, often dwarfing labor costs. It is worth noting that capital costs—also 
tightly related to the business environment—appear to be a major component of costs in 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zambia. 
 
 
Table 3.4. Composition of Indirect Costs by Country 
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Category  Ban Bol Chi  Eri  Eth Ind Ken Mor  Moz Nic Nig Tza Sen Uga  Zam 
Energy  0.18 0.16    0.26 0.45 0.37 0.35 0.51 0.20 0.32 0.28 0.59 0.59 0.21 0.32 
Land rent  0.08  0.00  0.32    0.05 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.02 
Transport 0.06  0.15  0.16  0.04 0.05 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.06    0.06         
Telecom 0.02  0.02    0.05 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.02    0.05         
Royalties 0.02  0.02      0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02        0.00      0.01 
Water   0.05    0.02    0.02  0.01  0.02        
Subcontracting   0.05  0.18              
Security       0.00  0.02    0.07  0.03  0.02        0.04 
Maintenance   0.04    0.09        0.08  0.32        
Spare parts    0.06                
Insurance   0.02  0.03        0.02        
Marketing   0.08  0.21  0.01        0.01  0.16        
Independent 
Professionals   0.03                
Office supplies    0.01          0.01        
Tickets, travel    0.02                
Export expenses    0.03  0.01              
Accounting       0.02            0.01        
Other costs  0.64  0.27  0.10  0.52 0.41 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.53 0.61 0.06 0.32 0.31 0.67 0.62 
Note: The China ICS included energy costs as part of total raw materials costs; we assume that energy costs account 
for one-third of total indirect costs in China, equal to the average across the other 14 countries. 
 
 
These cost breakdowns do not capture all factors that affect competitiveness.  For instance, 
transport costs in Africa are much higher than in Asia and Latin America.  To the extent that  
part of the excess is incurred indirectly in the form of higher prices for raw materials which we 
cannot directly observe,. Figure 3.3 underestimates the magnitude of “real” indirect costs in 
Africa and the productivity gaps shown above are biased upwards, because African firms facing 
high transport costs may be using less physical raw materials than the dollar values suggest. 
Similarly, if particular services are complementary to capital and labor and firms choose to use 
less of these due to their high prices, there may well be a negative impact on sales and measured 
productivity.  But on the other hand, if transport costs also raise the prices of outputs, the bias 
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Figure 3.3. Cost Structures, Firm-Level Average by Country 
 









































Net value added is now defined as gross value added less indirect costs.
29   As such, it is a 
broader indicator of firm performance than gross value added.  Figure 3.4 compares these two 
concepts of value added in per-worker terms.  In high-performing economies with relatively low 
indirect costs, median net value added is a high share of gross value added: 67 percent 
(Morocco), 71 percent (India), 74 percent (Bangladesh), 76 percent (Nicaragua), 82 percent 
(Senegal), and 85 percent (China). For Bolivia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Kenya, the range is 42-51 percent, suggesting a significant impact of cost disadvantages in these 
countries. For Zambia (22 percent), gross value added is already a small percentage of sales, so 




                                                 
29 Note that energy is included in our definition of net value added by including it in indirect costs (rather than 
including it in raw materials), so our term gross value added does not quite correspond to studies that include energy 
costs in raw materials. The breakdown of indirect costs and energy is given in Table 3.4.  In the rest of this 
discussion, our use of the term “indirect costs” includes the cost of energy. 
31 In our data, some firms that have positive gross value added have high enough indirect costs that their net value 
added is negative. These firms are then dropped from the net TFP regression. This biases the estimated gap between 
net and gross TFP downward, because firms with low gross TFP are dropped. To correct for this, the estimated 
average net TFP level by country is corrected for the number of firms for whom net TFP is essentially zero. 
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gross VA per worker net VA per worker
 
Note: Dollars are adjusted for purchasing power parity and cost of consumption versus investment goods. 
 
 
Net TFP is then estimated as:   
 
[2]    i i i i i i i L K IC M Y A Z δ β α − − − − − = ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ˆ ln(
 
Where Ấi is net TFP, IC is indirect costs, and (Y-M-IC) is net value-added.   We estimate country 
averages of firm-level net TFP  using country dummy variables to estimate gaps.
31  As before, 
several different methods were used to test for robustness including  translog and CES functions 
and stochastic frontier methods.  Again, all yielded very similar results for the country dummy 
variables. Therefore,  we use the results for the simplest method--OLS estimates of a Cobb-
Douglass production function.  The index computed from the residuals of this estimation is 
shown in Table 3.5.  
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Table 3.5: Estimation of [2]: Net Productivity Regression 
 
Variable  Coefficient Std  error 
Constant 3.62  0.26 
Log Capital  0.41 0.02 
Log Labor  0.62 0.04 
Bangladesh  1.70 0.14 
Bolivia  1.42 0.15 
China  2.27 0.14 
Eritrea  1.16 0.23 
Ethiopia  1.41 0.16 
India  2.24 0.13 
Kenya  1.61 0.17 
Morocco  2.04 0.14 
Mozambique  1.11 0.21 
Nicaragua  1.79 0.15 
Nigeria  1.18 0.18 
Senegal  1.98 0.18 
Tanzania  1.64 0.17 
Uganda  1.36 0.16 
Chemicals  0.49 0.39 
Food & beverage  1.08 0.33 
Metals & machinery  -0.07 0.34 
Textiles, garments & leather  2.55 0.30 
Wood & furniture  1.37 0.45 
L*ch (interaction)  0.09 0.06 
L*fb  0.11 0.06 
L*m  0.03 0.06 
L*tgl  -0.06 0.05 
L*w  0.32 0.09 
K*ch  -0.06 0.04 
K*fb  -0.11 0.03 
K*m  -0.02 0.04 
K*tgl  -0.18 0.03 
K*w  -0.22 0.05 





The gap between African and other firms widens when we move from gross to net TFP, as 
indirect costs interact with other firm characteristics (Figure 3.5).  African countries in the mid-
range of 40-60 percent of Chinese gross TFP fall to 20-40 percent when net TFP is compared.   
Kenya, which appears relatively strong on gross TFP, falls dramatically on net TFP as a result of 
                                                 
33 Trade reforms in Africa, for example, have been driven by adjustment programs negotiated with the Bretton 
Woods institutions rather than a  reciprocal process of negotiation with other countries to open market access.  It is 
therefore less surprising to see the persistence of widespread impediments to exporting firms despite declines in 
levels of protection (World Bank 2000, chapter 7).     
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very high indirect costs. Zambia, the most extreme case, falls from 30 percent to 10 percent. 
Only in Senegal—the strongest African performer on both gross and net TFP—is the effect of 
indirect costs relatively low. African countries have shortfalls in factory-floor productivity, but 
high indirect costs further weakens their relative performance.   
 
 






















































Profitability and Returns to Capital 
 
We now turn to a brief discussion of profitability.  In figure 3.6,  profits and cost subcategories 
are divided by sales and arrayed vertically so that the sum of profits and costs is one. Few 
African surveys indicate manufacturing sectors with high profit margins; this is further reflected 
in the returns to capital. Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda stand out here as the strongest African 
performers, Senegal because of its high productivity and low indirect costs, and Tanzania and 
Uganda because of low capital intensity and labor costs. These three compare favorably to 
Nicaragua and Morocco on profitability, because firms in the latter countries face extremely high 
labor costs. However, China and Morocco have relatively low labor costs, high productivity, and 
low indirect costs, and firm profitability in these countries reflects these factors.   Other than 
Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda, returns in Africa are quite low, and sharply negative in Zambia.  
 
Figure 3.6 shows that indirect costs squeeze African firms heavily. Moderate reductions would 
sharply increase the viability of African manufacturing enterprises, pushing many firms out of 
the red and making just-profitable firms much more lucrative. For most African countries, even 
reducing  indirect costs as a share of total costs to the level of Senegal would have a greater 
effect on profit margins than would a halving of labor costs.     Figure 3.7 and Table 3.6 present 
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the results of alternative scenarios of cost reduction for African firms, showing profitability 
levels and rates of return with reductions in indirect costs versus reductions in labor costs. On a 
related note, the three African countries with high capital costs as a share of total costs (Zambia, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria) are also the three least profitable countries. 
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Table 3.6. Return on Capital, Actual and Counterfactuals (Firm-Level Medians) 
 
Country Actual  With indirect costs reduced 
to 13% of total costs 
With 1/3 labor 
cost reduction 
Zambia -0.18  -0.08  -0.12 
Bolivia 0.00  0.10  0.07 
Ethiopia 0.01  0.04  0.03 
Morocco 0.02  0.03  0.08 
Nigeria 0.02  0.04  0.03 
Mozambique 0.03  0.14  0.08 
Eritrea 0.04  0.07  0.05 
Kenya 0.08  0.20  0.11 
Uganda 0.16  0.31  0.29 
Nicaragua 0.17  0.19  0.40 
Senegal 0.21  0.21  0.28 
Tanzania 0.26  0.57  0.33 
Bangladesh 0.35  0.35  0.54 
China 0.38  0.39  0.45 
India 0.71  0.76  0.93 
Note: Return on capital is calculated as profit / replacement cost of capital stock.  
 
 
Reducing indirect costs might be expected to boost profitability by an equivalent amount, but the 
complex interactions between costs and firm behavior suggest that simple arithmetic is not 
always on target. For instance, firms facing lower indirect costs and more reliable power supplies 
may use different technologies and more business services, further increasing their productivity 
and profitability. Also, part of the increases in profit margins may accrue to workers in the form 
of rent-sharing and higher wages. This suggests that further work should study the role of 




4.  REFORMING THE BUSINESS CLIMATE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY 
PERSPECTIVE  
 
“Why should we open our economy all for the benefit of South African and Asian business?” 
—Comment by high government official during the discussion of an ICA in Africa. 
 
The third theory of comparative advantage discussed above stresses the value of having dense 
networks of firms operating in a competitive environment and able to generate “thick markets” 
and learning externalities. This highlights the importance of entry for sparse economies. The 
ICAs indicate a long list of entry barriers; the Doing Business indicators confirm that they tend to 
be high in Africa and that progress in reducing them has lagged other developing regions. 
Recently, the World Bank’s Vice President for Africa remarked in a speech in Nairobi that 
despite a vast amount of analytical work on the private sector, no real dialogue has emerged 
between the private sector and the government. Why is change not faster?  
  28   
 
Money is part of the problem—easing the severe infrastructure constraints identified in the 
surveys and contributing to high indirect costs requires major investments. But many other 
aspects of the business climate involve improving the delivery of business services, reflect the 
need to consider the political economy that underlies state performance and capacity. We argue 
that reforms will need to confront the presence of long-established rent-seeking arrangements 
that benefit both the political and private sector elites. The arrangements are remarkably stable, 
reflecting the coexistence of strong presidential systems of governance, weak administrative and 
technical capacity, non-credible donor conditionality, and small domestic private sectors 
dominated by a few large and highly profitable firms, often foreign or minority-owned.   These 
structural and institutional features of African business sectors contribute to the political 
economy problem.   
 
4.1 Is the African Private Sector in a Low-Level Political Equilibrium?   
 
Political analyses of Africa, both old and new, shed light on the twin problems of slow growth 
and partially successful reforms. In his analysis of the political economy of the African private 
sector, Tangri (1999) argues that the minority Asian community in East Africa, which has 
thrived even in difficult times, often coexists with a small, wealthy, Black private sector, often 
closely aligned with the president or his associates. The success of this group is more defined by 
political connections and rent-sharing than by business expertise (Tangri 1999).  Van de Walle 
(2001) reinforces this perspective,  arguing that the political elite in Africa have learned to adapt 
to the currency of reform, while finding ways to preserve rent-seeking arrangements: 
 
  Leaders’ notion of the political viability of reform has changed over time. Their initial 
reaction was almost entirely negative because they viewed rapid reform as incompatible 
with the methods of rule they had fashioned over several decades of rule. Over time, this 
has changed: from the view that reform was not viable, leaders have understood that they 
had no choice but to adapt their methods of rule to the evolving environment…over time 
and through experimentation, they found that their hold on power could withstand the 
partial implementation of adjustment programs. It remains true that political elites do not 
believe they can survive without recourse to a policy regime of systematic interference, 
but they have learned to adapt this interference. (p. 170) 
 
Thus, governments have simply changed their methods of rent-seeking in response to donor-
driven reforms.  This has translated into a series of partial reforms without much change in the 
ability of the private sector to do business, leading to what is termed a “permanent crisis” in 
Africa. For the private sector, it has meant keeping up with ever-changing forms of government 
interference, as the sources of rents and the modalities of rent-seeking have shifted with reform 
efforts.  
 
Van de Walle argues that there has been little policy learning in Africa relative to Asia and Latin 
America,. Technocrats within the government have often been hostile to reforms because their 
involvement and inputs are limited relative to foreign experts. Partial reforms have been largely 
successful at keeping donors satisfied, often leading to repeated rounds of financing to address 
the same issues and ultimately resulting in toothless conditionality, the preservation of rent-
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seeking arrangements, and little real reform despite apparent progress at the macro level.
33 All of 
this has served to reinforce the lack of momentum on private sector development. 
 
ICAs are mostly technical, but some studies have begun to focus on the political feasibility of 
business climate reform. Reducing administrative barriers in Africa is enormously difficult, 
mainly because the state apparatus has long been used as to dispense patronage (Emery, 2003). 
Privatization programs have not been entirely successful at eliminating rent-seeking parastatals, 
and the privatization process itself has offered opportunities for rent-seeking and patronage. In a 
detailed analysis of the administrative requirements for setting up a business in Africa, Emery 
notes how “overall complexity places a premium on means of circumventing, or speeding up the 
process, which creates a flourishing environment for corruption.” Most, if not all, businesses are 
operating outside the law in at least one or more aspects and are vulnerable to government 
inspectors, no matter how minor the deviance. The survival of a business is consequently heavily 
dependent on a personal relationship with a minister or other high government official, which is 
often difficult to document or quantify. These relationships are crucial to firms that need to 
anticipate ad hoc policy or regulatory changes—a major concern of business as shown in the 
ICA surveys.  Emery concludes that “this vulnerability, combined with the arbitrary nature of 
enforcement arising from poor governance means that firms can be closed down or worse for 
operating in exactly the same way as their neighbors, their competitors, or their clients and 
suppliers” (Emery 2003).    
 
Failure to broaden the base of the business community increases the public’s skepticism of the 
private sector, and particularly of foreign-owned firms, in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the 
World Bank and other donors focus their dialogue on technical solutions to private sector 
development such as better roads, more power generation, and reduction of the regulatory 
burden, dialogues in the domestic press in Africa have focused largely on the proposition that the 
persistence of a private sector elite (whether foreign, ethnic minority, or Black) has prevented 
economic empowerment of the majority of Black Africans.  This configuration of interests 
increases the likelihood of countries falling into a low-level equilibrium.  With a dominant part 
of the business sector identified as not indigenous and shielded from “outside” entry by an  
adverse business environment, the fractured business community has less ability, and perhaps 
less incentive, to act as a powerful pressure group in favor of reform.   
 
The difficulty of shifting out of such an equilibrium is mirrored in African attitudes toward the 
private sector. While support for market-based approach to growth and development may be 
growing, it is still far from widespread, as measured by public attitude surveys.  The 
Afrobarometer surveys are particularly useful (Bratton et al. 2005) in that they reveal widely 
differing views of the private sector as provided by respondents in 15 African countries 
(Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). Only in 6 countries did a majority of 
respondents feel that a market economy was preferable to an economy run by the government: in 
these, the percentage of respondents indicating this preference averaged only 54 percent.  Only 
24 percent of respondents in Botswana expressed a preference for a free market over a 
government-run economy, with 26 percent for Lesotho, 39 percent for Namibia, and 37 percent 
for South Africa. In most countries, well over 50 percent of respondents supported the 
government being in charge of planning production and distribution of all goods and services.  
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In most countries a majority of respondents believe that the government should bear the main 
responsibility for ensuring the well-being of people: In Ghana, for example, 66 percent of 
respondents believed that “the government should retain ownership of its factories, businesses 
and farms.” Despite the recognition that corruption was widespread, over 72 percent of 
respondents agreed that “all civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is 
costly to the country.”  Finally, 58 percent of all respondents indicated that the government 
should be primarily responsible for job creation.  Most reform programs are greeted with 
lukewarm support or outright opposition—62 percent of respondents supported user fees and 54 
percent supported market pricing, but only 35 percent supported privatization, and 32 percent 
supported civil service reform across the countries surveyed. The results indicate that most 
Africans are skeptical that the private sector will deliver broad-based growth.  This is consistent 
with the discussions in the press of elite capture of the private sector.
34
 
4.2   Beneath Aggregate Gaps: Size, Ethnicity, and Foreign Ownership in Africa 
 
African business is often segmented, with small clusters of large, foreign, and ethnic minority–
owned firms that are quite different in character from their indigenous counterparts.
35 The 
performance of this small cluster appears to be much stronger than the average firm.  Its firms 
tend to be considerably more productive and to be much more likely to export. They also seem to 
have far more market power, and to be able to sustain their presence in Africa despite economic 
and political uncertainties. The existing literature (Tangri 1999; van de Walle 2001) suggest that 
this group relies on trust between its members and on alliances with the political elite to generate 
rents on a continuing basis.  
 
This business cleavage is reflected in the surveys.  In almost all the countries there is a strong 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm size (Table 4.1).  In Africa, this relationship 
also extends to ethnic minority ownership: the average indigenous African firm in Uganda has 16 
employees, compared with 60 for Asian-owned firms, 104 for European-owned firms, and 138 
for Middle Eastern–owned (mostly Lebanese) firms. With regard to domestic versus foreign 









Table 4.1: Average Firm Size (Number of Workers) by Ownership 
 
Country Domestic  Foreign  African  European Asian  Middle  Eastern  Other 
Bangladesh 149  340           
                                                 
34 Nellis(2005) discusses the difficult political economiy of privatization in Africa.   
35 In some countries, ethnic fragmentation between indigenous groups is also an issue.  For more on this in Ethiopia, 
see Mengistae (2001).  
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China 232  284           
Eritrea 38  52  40  52       
Ethiopia 22  15           
India 27  252           
Kenya 73  230  60  90  59  85  249 
Morocco 52  100           
Mozambique 34  45          
Nicaragua 14  60         
Nigeria 81  252  84  310  216  156  904 
Senegal 29  63  24  65  28  35   
Tanzania 29  159  23  84  46  43   
Uganda 19  68  16  104  60  138   
 
 
Large, foreign, and minority-owned firms in Africa tend to have higher productivity than 
indigenous firms and to export more than their smaller indigenous counterparts. Foreign and 
ethnic-minority firms outperform indigenous firms by a substantial margin in every country 
except Ethiopia and Eritrea. African business is thus segmented: small indigenous firms struggle 
to survive, while small numbers of larger, often foreign and ethnic-minority-owned  firms have 
productivity levels closer to those of the average firm in high-performing economies such as 
China and India. The most productive firms in Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Zambia also tend to be large, except that most state-owned enterprises are large but usually 
show low productivity. On average, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in India, China, 
Bangladesh, and Morocco have productivity levels only slightly lower than of those of larger 






                                                 
36 Stochastic frontier analyses show that small firms in Africa are well below the production frontier. 
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Productivity differentials between small, indigenous firms and larger, foreign, or minority-owned 
firms have been persistent over time (see several RPED country studies, 1995-present) and do 
not seem to be primarily driven by differences in indirect or opportunity costs. Large firms still 
incur heavy costs for self-provided infrastructure, transport, logistics, security, and other items.  
Market power reflected in higher product prices possibly  plays a role:  although large firms are 
more likely to be exporters, many also sell to the domestic market and enjoy very high market 
shares (see figure 4.3.)  Nigeria, the country with the least competition, is also perhaps the 














Figure 4.3: Median of Firms’ Self-Reported Market Share, by Size and Ownership 
 






















































Although large firms face many of the same constraints as small firms, they are able to adapt to 
this climate in different ways. For example, most large firms in Africa own a generator—except 
in Senegal where the power system works relatively well, and firms are notified well in advance 
of rolling blackouts—but not so for small firms (table 4.2). Finance is another service 
segmenting the private sector -- in many countries in Africa and elsewhere, the share of large 
firms with access to credit is much higher than that of small firms. Productivity differentials are 
in part related to access to finance; controlling for country fixed effects, firms that have a loan or 
overdraft account are around 6 percent more productive.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the amount of time that firms are in contact with the government, and that  large 
firms bear a substantially greater incidence of dealing with regulations and regulators. This may 
be a real burden but, given the persistent profitability of most large, foreign-owned, and ethnic 
minority firms, this is also consistent with larger amounts of time spent exchanging favors with 
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Table 4.2: Share of Firms Owning Generator by Firm Size 
Country  Micro  Small / Medium  Large / Very Large 
Bangladesh 0.28  0.53  0.88 
Bolivia 0.13  0.11  0.31 
China 0.0 0.14  0.38 
Eritrea 0.38  0.43  0.63 
Ethiopia 0.03  0.23  0.43 
India 0.23  0.76  0.91 
Kenya 0.46 0.67  0.89 
Morocco 0.14  0.15  0.28 
Mozambique 0.20  0.23  0.63 
Nicaragua 0.06  0.29  0.81 
Nigeria 0.83  0.96  0.99 
Senegal 0.23  0.19  0.16 
Tanzania 0.18  0.60  0.89 
Uganda 0.04  0.44  0.87 




Table 4.3:  Interaction with Government by Firm Size 
Inspection days, median  % Senior management time spent dealing with regulation, 
median   Country 
Micro  Small / 
Medium 
Large /  
Very Large  Micro  Small / 
 Medium 
Large /  
Very Large 
Bangladesh 6.5  10  12  1  3  3 
China       5  5  5 
Eritrea 7  4 4 1  2  5 
Ethiopia 3  7  6  1  1  1 
India 3  7  12  5  10  13 
Kenya 11  16  17  7.5  10  10 
Morocco 0  1  3       
Mozambique 3  3  3  10  5  8 
Nicaragua 4  15  32  6  18  17 
Senegal 9  13  13       
Tanzania 12  32  62  5  10  13 
Uganda 2  5 17 1  1  6 
Zambia   52  64  75  15  11  13 
 
 
Finally, the role of networks in the African private sector is crucial to understanding the nature of 
the cleavages.  Biggs and Shah 2004, show that the ethnicity of firms’ proprietors remains an 
important determinant access to credit, and a number of other performance variables, even when 
variables such as the education level of proprietors and title to marketable assets are included in 
regressions.  Networks, usually of ethnic minorities, and based on trust between members of a 
relatively small group,  help firms to overcome the limitations of financial markets (Fafchamps 
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2004); at the same time, they effectively exclude outsiders from areas of business.  Networks 
operate in many other regions, including fast-growing Asian countries where they may have 
similarly positive effects in enabling their members to compensate for dysfunctional market 
institutions.  But their overall impact is likely to be different in Asia and Africa, because of 
differences in economic density and market size.  In Asia, their adverse effect in stifling 
competition is likely to be small because of the competitive pressure of many firms belonging to 
many networks.  However, in Africa’s very small economies, the adverse effect of a few 
dominant networks or firms is likely to be far larger.  Firms in sparse economies are likely to 
weigh more heavily the costs and risks of encouraging entry through reforms than are firms in 
dense economies..  
 
Small, sparse, industrial sectors dominated by a few firms with high market share are therefore 
likely to see less dynamic competition.  The greater access of the larger and networked firms to 
technology, credit and business expertise creates rents which, even if shared with government,  
would be dissipated by more open entry.  This can reduce the incentive to push hard for better 
regulation and business services.  And even though much of the benefit of reforms may accrue to 
small firms, these doubt their ability to compete and are anyway often not the dominant business 
sector.  At the same time, the prominent role of minority and expatriate business increases public 
reservations over the market economy model, including over large privatizations (Nellis (2005)).  
The danger is a low-level equilibrium, with limited pressure for reform from the business 
community and the public, and limited response from government.   
 
Business environments usually improve slowly, but some argue that in Africa, these reforms 
seem to have occurred even more slowly than elsewhere. A search of World Bank documents 
revealed that the Bank argued no less than 14 times between 1990 and the present that Africa 
was about to turn the corner in terms of policy reform (Easterly 2003). Donors have contributed 
billions of dollars to road construction across Africa, but the overall quality of road networks has 
improved little due to poor maintenance. Easterly also observes that the World Bank has made 
several loans to Kenya for road improvements with little to show for it.  Technical 





The main issue raised in this paper is the importance of including losses and indirect costs in 
firm-level analysis.  Not all risks and costs characteristic of poor business environments are 
covered, only a set  distinguished in firm surveys and expressed relative to sales revenues. 
Conventional or “gross” TFP, a “factory floor” concept, can be extended to “net” TFP by 
incorporating indirect costs into a net analog of value-added, so including a wider span of 
operational costs born by the firm.  Net TFP varies much more across countries than gross TFP.  
In general, African firms rate low on gross TFP, in the range of 40-80% of China’s level, 
depending on how estimation is done.  Part of this gap in gross TFP is accounted for by 
excessive output losses caused by factors external to the firm.   The relative performance of 
African firms drops further when net TFP is used to compare firms across countries, to only 20-
40% of China’s productivity.  For most African countries, reducing indirect costs even to the 
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level of Senegal, the best performer in the African group, would have a greater impact on profit 
margins than halving labor costs.   
 
Macroeconomic data confirm that Africa tends to be a “high cost” region, and the firm-level 
estimates provide confirming evidence of how high costs impact on industrial competitiveness.  
Countries that have been able to diversify into manufactured exports tend to have low cost levels 
relative to PPP predictions and also lower indirect costs to firms.   In many African countries, the 
problem is not so much that labor is high cost relative to factory-floor productivity.  It is rather 
that high indirect costs and losses lower the return to labor in production and thus depresses labor 
demand and real wages. This story varies considerably across and within countries. Zambian and 
Mozambican firms have relatively weak factory-floor productivity to begin with, and their value 
added is heavily squeezed by high costs, with three-fourths of Zambia’s net TFP shortfall 
relative to China accounted for by excess indirect costs. This is also true, if to a somewhat lesser 
extent, in Nigeria and Ethiopia. Uganda and Tanzania appear to be middle-of-the-road 
performers, in addition to Eritrea, although the data on the latter are probably heavily influenced 
by state favoritism and anticompetitive rents. In Kenya, a long history of entrepreneurship is 
reflected in strong potential factory-floor productivity, but high costs and losses impede 
competitiveness. Senegal provides an example of what an African country can achieve with a 
strong business community working in a relatively good business environment. 
 
The second issue raised in the paper is the segmentation of African business sectors on the basis 
of ethnicity, ownership and firm size. Large, foreign, and minority firms typically have much 
higher factory-floor productivity than their smaller indigenous counterparts, although they still 
face high costs. Even though these firms are more likely to export, they also sell domestically, 
and tend to have very large shares in their small, sparse markets.  This may reduce competitive 
pressure and the drive to innovate and expand.     Ethnic and structural cleavages in African 
business sectors also have implications for the political economy of reform.  Poor business 
environments generate entry barriers that provide larger firms with anticompetitive rents. Firms 
that might potentially push for reform are therefore faced with a choice between a hostile 
business environment that they have learned to negotiate and an unknown situation with 
potentially large increases in entry and competition.   
 
The likelihood that this equilibrium will be sustained is buttressed by the ambivalent attitudes 
toward the business sector expressed in Afrobarometer surveys. The fact that in most countries 
the business sector is heavily segmented, with expatriate and minority firms occupying the upper 
echelons in terms of productivity and capacity to export, does nothing to make this situation less 
complex. The risk is that Africa will remain locked into a slowly evolving low-level equilibrium, 
characterized by rent-seeking behavior on the part of the public sector, quiet acquiescence on the 
part of the private business sector, slow entry, continuing sparseness of firms and entrepreneurial 
activity, and limited gains from competition and conglomeration.    In the low-level equilibrium, 
measures to open Africa’s economies and improve regulation will have a limited effect because 
of the limited incentives to focus on business services and the institutional underpinnings of 
competitiveness.  
 
How can the momentum of reform be accelerated? Benchmarking performance in the various 
areas highlighted by ICAs will facilitate more constructive dialog on business-climate variables 
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in discussions among governments, firms, and donors. However, in thinking about moving 
forward on the business environment agenda, solutions need to be framed by political economy 
considerations.  Accelerating reform requires the difficult task of breaking up alliances between 
the private sector elite and the political elite. One approach is to pursue partial reforms which 
create new opportunities for the private sector while rents in established areas are slowly eroded 
over time.  This can help to convince the private sector elite that the profits in a relatively open 
economy may well be greater than current levels, particularly if costs can be significantly 
reduced at the same time. Policies that encourage the arrival of new entrants into the private 
sector will also be very useful in increasing economic density.   
 
•  Focus on reducing the most severe indirect costs faced by firms.  In most countries, the 
availability and reliability of power emerges as a clear priority. Transport and logistics-
related losses and costs and high in most countries, while telecommunications and 
security costs are high in others.  The ICAs can help to benchmark some of these costs 
against more competitive countries, including within Africa itself.   
 
•  Level the Playing Field. Building strong domestic political support for private sector 
development will require improving the performance and capacity of indigenous firms, 
removing the perception that reforms primarily benefit minorities or foreigners.  
Programs to mitigate political risk, for example, are currently only available to foreign 
investors; they should be extended to domestic investors on similar terms. Tax incentives 
should be extended to small businesses if offered to large ones. Capacity building is 
needed for the private sector (especially the indigenous private sector where productivity 
is low) as well as the public sector, Sub-Saharan Africa has not a single accredited 
business school outside of South Africa. 
 
•  Enclave Growth to Increase Business Density.  Even if political resistance and weak 
capacity stalls sweeping countrywide reforms, it may be feasible to improve business 
services  in limited, high-profile areas such as export processing zones (EPZs). Within 
EPZs, service delivery standards can be benchmarked and regularly evaluated;  EPZs can 
also help to  address the problem of low firm density; they can reduce infrastructure costs 
and encourage technology diffusion and knowledge spillovers. The World Development 
Report 2005 highlights individual country experiences where firms in EPZs have 
developed backward linkages to small suppliers.  EPZs may also serve to attract new 
entrants. 
 
•  Use Gains to Build Constituencies for Reform. Success in even a single enclave sector 
can generate demonstration effects across an economy, weakening the perception among 
large firms and governments that a low-level equilibrium characterized by high costs and 
low competition is preferable. Press accounts of the Indian experience suggest that the 
enormous success of the high-technology sector in the early 1990s (accomplished largely 
without government assistance) set the standard for the rest of India’s private sector; both 
firms and the government wanted to share the limelight and started to move away from 
the old model of the “license raj.” In Africa, examples such as Kenya’s agribusiness 
sector (which links large firms, small firms, and farms) and the EPZs of Mauritius and 
Madagascar offer potential examples that should become far better known. In China, 
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successful local development rebounded directly to the advantage of local officials, 
setting up strong competition between local governments to attract investments (Byrd and 
Gelb 1990). Africa might consider how such incentives can be structured to boost, rather 
than retard, productivity.  For example, top customs officials might receive incentive 
payments based on both revenue and clearance time standards, along the lines of 




•  Enhance the Profile and  Credibility of Reforms.  Social sector indicators and reforms 
currently enjoy a higher profile in country-donor discussions, than business-related 
reforms, and the focus on performance standards has not yet carried through into the 
latter area.  Innovative instruments could increase the visibility of business-related 
reforms.  For example, donor-funded facilities could enable firms to purchase insurance 
against shortfalls in service delivery from standards agreed as part of reform programs—
in customs clearance times, or value-added tax (VAT) rebates for exporters, initially 
within EPZs, or possibly against power outages.  This would provide impetus for 
accurate measurement of performance (and targets to focus capacity-building efforts) and 
also ensure that lapses in performance are speedily raised to a high policy level.  Once 
confirmed, these service standards and the insurance programs could be implemented 
more broadly across the economy. The objective is less to compensate business than to 
ensure that business-related services receive greater attention. 
 
•  Capitalize on the Concern over Donor Dependence. Increased donor dependence is 
inevitable for African countries if they are to embark on a determined push toward 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Yet countries such as Uganda and 
Mozambique, with 50 percent of their budgets dependent on donors, perceive the political 
implications of this and aim to reduce donor dependence from present levels. In a recent 
speech, the president of Uganda urged his countrymen to become less dependent on 
foreign aid -- Tanzania, which hosts 1,000 donor meetings every year and prepares 2,500 
donor reports every quarter, may also feel the need to reduce donor dependence (Birdsall 
2004). More explicit linkage between private sector development and a reduction in 
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Appendix: Additional Data on Firm-Level Costs 
 
A.1.1. Response Rates for Sales and Costs Data by Ownership and Exporter Status 
 
Domestic Foreign  Non-exporter  Exporter 
Country  Sales Costs Sales Costs Sales Costs Sales Costs 
Bangladesh  0.98 0.89  1  0.85 0.87 0.89  1  0.9 
Bolivia      0.61  0.43  0.67  0.49 
China  1 0.79 1 0.79 1 0.74 1 0.81 
Eritrea  0.52  0.4  0.59 0.53 0.56 0.45 0.29 0.29 
Ethiopia  0.99 0.92  1  0.95 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.93 
India  1 0.63 1 0.73 1 0.53 1 0.61 
Kenya  0.59  0.57  0.76 0.6  0.6 0.57  0.67  0.61 
Morocco  1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.96 
Mozambique  0.75 0.36 0.67 0.33 0.72 0.34 0.86  0.5 
Nicaragua 1  0.6  1 0.64 1 0.59 1 0.65 
Nigeria  0.92 0.75 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.78  1  0.78 
Senegal  0.89 0.51 0.86 0.55 0.88 0.53 0.92 0.49 
Tanzania  0.88 0.44 0.78 0.48 0.86 0.42 0.84  0.6 
Uganda  0.52 0.28 0.52  0.3  0.67 0.26 0.66  0.4 
Zambia  0.84 0.85 0.72 0.76  0.8  0.84 0.84 0.78 
 
 
Table A.1.2 Response Rates by Ethnicity 
 
   African  European  Asian  Middle Eastern 
   Sales Costs Sales Costs Sales Costs Sales Costs 
Eritrea  0.53  0.43  0.5  0.5      
Kenya  0.61  0.61 0.7  0.6 0.58  0.57     
Mozambique  0.7 0.29 0.8 0.39  0.72  0.34     
Nigeria  0.93 0.76 0.84 0.76 0.88 0.88 0.74 0.67 
Senegal  0.92 0.46  0.8  0.53 0.82 0.63     
Tanzania  0.86 0.37 0.75 0.44 0.81 0.54  0.9  0.2 












  45   
Table A.1.3. Response Rates by Size 
 
   Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Very Large 
   Sales Costs Sales Costs Sales  Costs Sales  Costs Sales  Costs 
Bangladesh  0.68  0.6 1  0.91 1  0.94  1  0.89 1  0.94 
Bolivia 0.22  0.11  0.86  0.58  0.87  0.72  0.83  0.67  0.87  0.78 
China 1  0.38  0.99  0.69  1  0.75  1  0.83  1  0.82 
Eritrea 0.75  0.25  0.46  0.39  0.43  0.43  0.69  0.63  0.5  0.5 
Ethiopia  0.97  0.9 1  0.91 1  0.93  1  1  1  0.82 
India 1  0.65  1  0.53  1  0.8  1  0.86  1  0.82 
Kenya 0.3  0.2  0.59  0.62  0.83  0.74  0.65  0.59  0.62  0.5 
Morocco 1  1  1  0.95  1  0.93  1  0.95  1  0.93 
Mozambique 0.73  0.29  0.84  0.42  0.57  0.35  0.65  0.31  1 0.5 
Nicaragua 1  0.48  1  0.63  1  0.82  1  0.86  1  0.67 
Nigeria 0.5  0.17  0.86  0.57  0.89  0.84  0.93  0.87  0.97  0.91 
Senegal 0.8  0.33  0.9  0.49  0.92  0.45  0.85  0.47  0.91  0.46 
Tanzania 0.85  0.1  0.86  0.33  0.81  0.48  0.9  0.66  0.82  0.29 
Uganda 0.7  0.06  0.67  0.13  0.56  0.12         
Zambia 0.1  0.1  0.79  0.8  0.87  0.84  0.89  0.83  0.85  0.92 
 
 
Table A.1.4. Value Added and Capital per Worker, Price Adjusted 
 
VA / L, $  K / L, $ 
 Country  Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Very Large Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Very Large
Eritrea
a 12,826 10,836  24,105  8,846  7,077  54,365 65,238 191,843 194,055  53,443 
Ethiopia 3,422  3,136  4,277  5,988  3,707  4,515  11,643 17,820  21,860  20,909 
Nigeria   4,118  4,413  8,384  9,119    42,164 31,500  61,040  46,944 
Kenya   5,252  9,303  18,906 6,902  31,510 17,005 29,259  25,008  17,005 
Mozambique  1,431 5,112 11,451 8,997    9,202  21,130 19,085 41,748   
Senegal 14,681  17,903  40,819  37,239 34,613  18,798 13,726 22,479  23,772  1,989 
Tanzania  3,548 4,862 11,037 8,935  17,870  2,299  12,921 10,402 29,017  28,798 
Uganda 3,072  3,321  5,314  15,942 3,155  2,214  4,290  13,008  24,494  2,906 
Zambia   1,493  1,773  2,333  4,666    15,008 21,773  10,420  21,384 
Bangladesh 3,654 5,000  6,346  4,615  4,423  1,538 5,577  6,346  3,077  4,423 
India 8,810  16,667  15,238  18,095 27,381  7,143  7,143  8,810  13,571  28,571 
Bolivia 3,023  3,953  7,093  5,698  17,093  2,791  5,000  10,930  12,442  25,698 
Nicaragua 7,000  8,167  12,167  34,000 12,333 3,167  4,333  4,167 19,000  4,500 
China 6,329  8,040  14,198  13,171 14,540  6,842  4,154  6,109  6,842  20,527 
Morocco   13,665  16,165  11,999 17,498    12,444 9,415  4,653  5,519 
a. Eritrea’s exceptionally high capital numbers are puzzling. They in part reflect a very low aggregate price level 
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Table A.1.5 Age Structure of Capital, Average (%) 
 
Country  <10 years  >10 years 
India 70  30 
Morocco 62 28 
Eritrea 48  52 
Ethiopia 49  51 
Kenya 47  53 
Morocco 62 28 
Mozambique 49  37 
Senegal 67  33 
Tanzania 47 53 
Uganda 75  25 
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Table A.1.7: Relative Net TFP by Firm Size 
 
 
Country  Micro  Small, Medium Large, Very large
Bangladesh 0.24  0.23  0.19 
Bolivia 0.30  0.22  0.28 
China 0.26  0.55  0.50 
Eritrea 0.17 0.20  0.15 
Ethiopia 0.07  0.10  0.06 
India 0.26  0.39  0.42 
Kenya 0.26 0.22  0.33 
Mozambique 0.05  0.15  0.32 
Morocco ..  0.55  0.53 
Nicaragua 0.33  0.43  0.82 
Nigeria   0.13  0.21 
Senegal 0.26  0.64  0.61 
Tanzania 0.17  0.32  0.39 
Uganda 0.17  0.16  0.28 
Zambia   0.08  0.41 
 
 











Waste Disposal  0.004 
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